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Emilio Meyer and Thomas Bustamante thoroughly analyzed the Brazilian
government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. They conclude that the Brazilian
case “seems to show that emergency powers may not be necessary for a situation
of health crisis” as the Brazilian Emergency Constitution – a set of emergency
provisions enshrined in our founding document – is still dormant. Indeed, in their
words, what we see in Brazil is the use of the “legislative and executive apparatuses”
to “enforce measures for protecting public health”. But that does not mean, that
emergency powers in Brazil are not yet in reach.
Not a Brazilian Orbán
Notwithstanding our latent Emergency Constitution, I do not believe that Brazil
is an example of a country that is handling the coronavirus outbreak without the
aid of emergency powers. I agree that Bolsonaro, unlike Orbán , will not be taking
advantage of the crisis to bootstrap himself into a more authoritarian position
anytime soon. Brazil’s President is so isolated that one can reasonably conclude that
he has completely lost control over the federal government.
Public opinion polls show that the Health Minister, Luiz Mandetta, enjoys significantly
more public support than the President. While Bolsonaro refuses to acknowledge
the true extent of the crisis, having notoriously called it “a little flu”, Mandetta, on
the other hand, is publicly antagonizing his boss by promoting social distancing as
the only efficient nationwide policy at this time. The stalemate reached its climax on
April 6th, when Bolsonaro threatened to remove Mandetta from the ministry, only
to disgracefully concede defeat a few hours later due to a major backlash. So far it
looks like the military leadership that sponsored his presidential bid in 2018 had the
final say on the matter.
In sum, Bolsonaro currently does not look like a promising candidate for exercising
emergency powers at this moment. He lacks meaningful political support and is
facing the upheaval of his own cabinet. In fact, state governments are the real
protagonists in the fight against the novel coronavirus. Nevertheless, it is my
understanding that we cannot leapfrog from the evaluation of the current political
landscape to the conclusion that there are no emergency powers on the table. This
conclusion only makes sense if the analysis is limited to the Neo-Roman model of
emergency powers.
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The legislative model too gives birth to a state of
emergency
Under that paradigm, which is modeled after the Roman dictatorship, emergency
powers are vested in the executive and should be exercised both in a conservative
and temporary fashion. The scope of these extraordinary entitlements and the
actors involved in identifying and ultimately declaring the state of emergency are all
stipulated ex ante in the constitutional text. If, for whatever reason, the constitutional
roadmap is not followed, one can argue that no emergency plan was actually set in
motion.
Nevertheless, the Brazilian case is an example of how political elites may be willing
to operate under a new model of emergency powers, which involves a novel and
intricate political calculus. Accordingly, my argument relies on the “legislative model”
that was theoretically crafted by Farejohn and Pasquino more than a decade ago.
Under this model, Congress can bypass the Emergency Constitution and arrive at a
comparable legal destination.
The model’s blueprint is quite simple. The government deals with an emergency
the same way it would deal with other managerial issues: by delegating power to
the executive branch through ordinary legislative means. Instead of relying on the
powers that were set forth by the Emergency Constitution, Congress itself gets
to decide what the emergency powers look like. The legislature can then draw
from a comparative catalog only those powers that are more appealing given the
situation that the country is facing. As Farejohn and Pasquino argue, the legislative
model is more flexible and allows for legislative oversight of the executive during the
emergency. Congress also has the prerogative of ending the emergency when it
sees fit.
This model raises a number of potential problems that Farejohn and Pasquino
address in depth. My point is that the legislative model gives birth to a state of
emergency just like the activation of the Emergency Constitution would. I rely, of
course, on a dualistic view of governmental powers. The ‘norm’ is what one may call
regular government. This ‘norm’ is derogated under the state of emergency to allow
public officials to perform certain actions that would otherwise be prohibited (or at
least limited). This thin definition of a state of emergency highlights the fact that such
derogation can happen either through constitutional or ordinary legislative means.
The legal system operating outside the boundaries
of legal normality
To say the least, these are exceptional times. And the Brazilian legal system is
responding accordingly by authorizing exceptional legal actions. The signs are hard
to miss.  On March 20th, Congress enacted a “legislative decree” in which it declares
a “state of public calamity”, invoking the powers granted by the complementary law
n. 101. This declaration has two distinct effects. First, it suspends important statutory
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limitations and allows the government to expend more financial resources to fight the
pandemic than it would otherwise be authorized to. Second, and most importantly,
it creates an oversight committee that will be responsible for tracking governmental
expenditure related to the public health emergency.
The Brazilian legal system has a strong attachment to the principle of “fiscal
responsibility”. Political debates aside, a President was just impeached for allegedly
breaching this principle. In ordinary times, the government is severely limited in its
ability to manage its own purse. However, this can be “one limitation too much” when
the country’s public health system is overwhelmed by a pandemic. In this case, an
exception is justified so the government can expend more money to deal with a
developing situation.
After a formal request was made by the executive, Congress agreed to offer this
exception through ordinary legislative means. Yet this hardly means we are still
operating within an ordinary legal framework. Quite the contrary, the Brazilian
government is authorized to go beyond existing legal limits so it can minimize the
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Yes, Bolsonaro is still urging his supporters to
defy science and go on with their normal lives. But this should not blind us to the
fact that the Brazilian legal system is not operating within the boundaries of legal
normality.
The door to the realm of emergency powers is open
While Emilio Meyer and Thomas Bustamante’s political investigation is flawless and
even mind-boggling (something only Bolsonaro can add to the mix during such trying
times), they do not account for how these boundaries of legal normality have already
been pushed.
One can counter my arguments by saying that this is a mild form of emergency.
“Better to allow for a breach of the principle of ‘fiscal responsibility’ than to follow
Orbán’s footsteps and end up jailing journalists for spreading fake news.” I do not
contest that. However, the door that leads us to the realm of emergency powers
is already open. While we patiently wait for the Emergency Constitution to wake
up from its doctrinal sleep, Congress has already bypassed it and is venturing into
uncharted territory. We have to stay vigilant or risk being caught off guard.
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